


Using LIP to Gloss Over Single-Stage Face Detection Networks



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Can we attack a face detector?



Adversarial Perturbations:

- Imperceptible perturbations that change the neural network output significantly
- Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [1]:

$$X^{adv} = X + \alpha \cdot \text{sign}(\nabla_x \ell(f_\theta(X), y^{true}))$$

- Prior works are in image classification [1], semantic segmentation [2,3] and object detection [3]
- The attack in object detection is more difficult:
 - Need to ensure all region proposals associated with the object/instance are successfully attacked

We are the first to study adversarial attack in single-stage face detection:

- Single-stage detector:
 - Performs object classification and localization simultaneously, e.g. YOLO and SSD. This work uses the face detector, HR [4]

References

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- [4] P. Hu and D. Ramanan. Finding tiny faces. In CVPR, 2017.
- [5] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio. Adversarial examples in the physical world. arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.02533, 2016.
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Acknowledgements

This work has been funded by Sullivan Nicolaides Pathology, Australia, and the Australian Research Council (ARC) Linkage Projects Grant LP160101797. Arnold Wiliem is funded by the Advance Queensland Early-Career Research Fellowship.


Instance Perturbation Interference (IPI) Problem

Image based Perturbation (IMP):

- Following the FGSM, the perturbations are generated and applied w.r.t. the entire image


Existence of the IPI problem:

Number of Faces	Distance	Attack Success Rate (%)
1	40	100
	40	51.5
9	160	56
	240	63.9
64	40	18.3



- The attack success rate drops when the number of faces increases
- With the same number of faces, the attack success rate can be increased as the distances among faces increase

Proposed Method: LIP



Explanations of the IPI problem:

- Our adversarial perturbation is a 2D Gaussian distribution:

$$\nabla_x L(f_\theta(X, t_c), -1) = \frac{\partial L(f_\theta(X, t_c), -1)}{\partial f_\theta(X, t_c)} \cdot \frac{\partial f_\theta(X, t_c)}{\partial X}$$

- The Effective Receptive Field (ERF) is a fraction of TRF, where pixels have significant impact to the neuron decision [6]

Localized Instance Perturbation (LIP):

Aim: eliminating the interfering perturbation

- Perturbation cropping according to the instance ERF:

$$R_{m_i} = C_{e_i} \cdot \nabla_x L_{m_i}, \text{ where } C_{e_i}(w, h) = \begin{cases} 1, & (w, h) \in e_i \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- Individual instance perturbation (processing each instance separately): $R = \sum_{i=1}^N C_{e_i} \cdot \nabla_x L_{m_i}$


15seconds-Summary

Questions: Why existing adversarial perturbation methods are not effective when there are multiple objects/instances?

Contributions:


- IPI Problem:** The interfering perturbations disrupt the adversarial perturbations generated for the neighboring objects/instances
- Explanations:** Perturbations overlap with the neighboring object Effective Receptive Field
- Method:** We propose the Localized Instance Perturbation (LIP) that confines the perturbation inside the Effective Receptive Field of a target.

Results



The detection results by the HR are shown in original and perturbed images. (Yellow: true positives; Red: false positives)

Evaluation on Synthetic Images:



Evaluation on Face Detection Datasets:

Perturbations	Sets	None	I-FGSM			
			IMP	LP	LIP-A	LIP-H
Detection Rate (%)	Easy	92.4	46.2	30.1	28.2	26.5
	Medium	90.7	50.7	34.7	32.2	31.1
	Hard	77.3	45.9	29.3	23.6	26.6
Attack Success Rate (%)	Easy	-	50.0	67.4	69.5	71.3
	Medium	-	44.1	61.7	64.5	65.7
	Hard	-	40.6	62.1	69.5	65.6

Evaluation on Object Detection Datasets:

Perturbations	IMP	LP
Average Recall	7.9	2.2
Average Precision	6.9	1.9